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Abstract: The transition from communism to capitalism was necessarily 
accompanied by a sudden and abrupt increase in the financialization of society. This 
increase occurred in an environment that, even now, still has little experience with or 
expertise in financialization. Given that financialization occurred simultaneously with 
the growth and evolution of other political and economic institutions, the question 
arises: What was the effect on these other nascent institutions like property rights? 
This article empirically analyzes the relationship between financialization and property 
rights in transition countries. Using a unique monthly database of twenty transition 
countries over a period from 1989 to 2012, this article finds that the influence of 
financialization depends on which definition of “financialization” is used. In 
particular, increases in basic financial intermediation improved property rights. 
However, higher-order “financialization,” proxied here by the size of capital markets 
and the wages in the financial sector, appeared to have a negative impact on the 
development of broad-based property rights in transition. 
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The economic transition in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union 
(FSU) has heavily relied on the development of a formal financial sector as “capitalism” cannot 
be built without funding or finance. Enabled by varying levels of financial liberalization across 
the region (with the CEE countries going much further, much faster than their FSU 
counterparts), foreign financial institutions contributed to the broadening and deepening of 
financial markets — in particular, the development of a broad-based banking sector (Table 1) — 
in countries that had had no experience with formal financial intermediation (Caviglia, Krause 
and Thimann 2003; Hartwell 2013).  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Much economic research has been done on financial sector development in transition, 
with early papers like Erik. Berglof and Patrick. Bolton’s (2002) work noting the existence of a 
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“Great Divide” in terms of financial sector performance. By contrast, there has been a 
correspondingly lower emphasis on the socio-economic effects of the financial sector transition 
in CEE and FSU, especially as it pertains to the process of “financialization” (Raviv [2008] and 
Gabor [2010] are notable exceptions). In its broadest definition, financialization typically refers 
to “the increasing dominance of the finance industry in the sum total of economic activity, of 
financial controllers in the management of corporations, [and] of financial assets among total 
assets” (Dore 2002, 116-117). This definition, focusing on the extent of the financial sector and 
its impact on society, means that financialization was a crucial part of the transition process in 
many ways, as “capitalism” could not be built without “capital.”  
More precise definitions of other facets of financialization, however, raise other questions 
about financial sector development in transition. In particular, Gerald Epstein (2005, 3) notes 
that financialization may also capture “the growing dominance of capital market financial 
systems over bank-based financial systems,” a point that Ronald Dore (2002, 117) also implied 
when describing “the stock market as a market for corporate control.” This is an accurate 
description of the process of financial sector development in transition because transition saw a 
compressed version of the financial development that took place in developed economies, with 
the main difference being that financialization in the forms of capital markets accompanied, 
rather than preceded, bank-based intermediation. This turn of events was due mainly to the 
forces responsible for shaping financial sector development in these countries. As has been 
argued elsewhere (Berglof and Bolton 2002; Gabor 2012; Hartwell 2014b), the process of 
financial sector development in transition economies was simultaneously an endogenously 
generated, but exogenously-pushed phenomena, with the precise path of financial development 
being influenced by donors and external actors. In particular, the process of financial sector 
development, and the ensuing expansion of financial usage in society, filled a need for longer-
term financial intermediation, especially in regard to the burgeoning private sector. The 
structure of the ensuing financial sector in each country, however, was driven by foreign bank 
entry and by international donor agencies, such as USAID and the World Bank. While these 
exogenous forces and the extent of their influence was also (in some sense) endogenously 
determined — host country governments could ignore the World Bank advice, non-solicited 
donors funds, or put obstacles in the way of foreign bank or capital market entry — the 
presence of such external pressure did contribute to the path that financial markets ultimately 
took in transition. 
Given this peculiar nature of financialization in transition, it is perhaps instructive to 
consider a third definition of financialization, as advanced by Greta Krippner (2005). 
According to Krippner (2005, 181), “financialization reflects the increasing political and 
economic power of a rentier class.” It is this definition that appears to be most broadly 
understood in the recent financialization literature (van der Zwan 2014), wherein the pursuit 
of financial accumulation contributes to unstable financial systems and comes at the expense of 
wage earners. Beyond the positive description of finacialization that the first two definitions 
contain, this third definition implicitly offers a normative critique of financial sector 
development — across both transition- and capitalist countries. 
When conceptualizing financialization as the increasing power of the financial/rentier 
class, coupled with the reality that much financial sector development was exogenously 
influenced (and indeed found a common cause with endogenous forces) in transition, one 
arrives at an interesting comparative research question: How did this route of imported 
financialization, creating a rentier class, affect the development of other crucial economic 
institutions in transition? This question is not peripheral to our understanding of the 
economic transformation in formerly communist countries, as the very heart of transition or 
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transformation was the changing of institutions that discarded the anachronistic communist-
era institutions in favor of those suited to a free-market economy. These institutions were also 
growing, changing, expanding, and evolving during the same period in which financial markets 
were growing, adapting to new market and political conditions. How were these institutions, 
predominant among which were property rights, affected by an exogenously inspired 
financialization? 
This question reflects the other side of a research agenda with a long pedigree in relation 
to financial markets, seeking to understand the relationship of institutional development to 
financial market growth. A familiar and established body of work asserts that financial markets 
need “good” institutions to exist and thrive (among some of the most recognizable authors 
being Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1996; Durham 2002; and de la Torre, Gozzi and Schmulker 
2007), but there is comparatively little work on how financial markets can influence the 
development of other political and economic institutions in a society. This is a crucial question 
in regards to both financialization and institutional economics since, undoubtedly, there is a 
feedback mechanism between financial markets and other institutions that can influence 
developmental paths of a society (Hartwell 2014a). Therefore, in order to understand the 
effects of financialization (and especially financialization in transition), it must be analyzed with 
an institutional lens, with financialization as a process placed into the web of institutions that 
accompanied the economic and political transition of CEE and FSU countries. 
Thus, my purpose in this article is to examine whether the increase in financialization in 
transition economies over the past quarter of a century, including and beyond bank-based 
intermediation, helped or hindered the development of other crucial institutions, in particular 
property rights. The contribution of this research is thus threefold: (i) to form a bridge between 
institutional and financialization approaches to understanding financial development; (ii) to 
focus on a highly specific context — namely, transition economies, which have been relatively 
underexplored in the financialization literature thu8s far; and (iii) to introduce empirical and 
econometric rigor to an approach that has been more focused on theory and positive 
description. This examination will provide better understanding of the interplay of 
financialization with other institutions, as well as recognition of the consequences of 
financialization outside of the Anglo-American or Western-European sphere. 
 
Financialization and Its Eastward Expansion 
 
Research on the phenomenon of financialization has been a fruitful area in recent years, as 
evidenced by Natascha. van der Zwan’s (2014) sweeping survey of the first decade of 
scholarship. As van der Zwan correctly notes, the financialization literature has grappled with 
the issue of what “financialization” actually means, with one unifying factor in the literature 
being that financialization is “a view of finance beyond its traditional role as provider of capital 
for the productive economy” (van der Zwan 2014, 99). This broad consensus is subdivided into 
three separate approaches on understanding the spread of financialization: (i) financialization 
as a regime of accumulation; (ii) financialization of the firm and the ascendance of shareholder 
value; and (iii) the permeation of financialization into everyday life. In turn, these three 
approaches have spawned countless research studies into the various attributes of 
financialization, mainly focused on the US (Krippner 2005) or Europe (Becker and Jäger 2012), 
with only a few going beyond these geographical areas (notable exceptions being Becker et al. 
2010; Gabor 2010; Rethel 2010).  
The emphasis on the U.S. and Anglo-American varieties of capitalism has been a way to 
pick low-hanging fruit, but the experience of the transition economies offers a more fertile 
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ground for observing the complex interactions between finance, financialization, and 
institutions. However, the question of financialization in transition economies has only been 
taken up belatedly (prominently by Gabor 2010, 2012; Raviv 2008), perhaps due to both the 
paucity of data and the reality of financialization arriving late in transition economies. Perhaps 
the key issue inhibiting an examination of financialization in transition has been the 
limitations of the three approaches identified by van der Zwan (2014) in explaining the 
transformation in CEE and FSU countries. Of the three dominant research strains, research 
on financialization of the firm is the least relevant in the transition context, mainly due to the 
hangover of communist management practices, higher levels of risk-aversion, and dependence 
on foreign capital (which means that firm-level investment decisions are made elsewhere) (see 
Nölke and Vliegenthar 2009). Similarly, financialization of everyday life in transition 
economies is an interesting take on the individual-level transition, but has less relevance for 
transition economies as a whole due to their differing levels of financialization. As a result, it is 
better suited for a country case study and this places it beyond the scope of this article (for 
details, see Goldstein 2009; Schwartz and Seabrooke 2008). 
Thus, the most salient definition of financialization in transition relates to the role of 
financialization as a regime of accumulation. Greta.R. Krippner (2005, 198-199) defines 
accumulation literature by showing that “accumulation [in the US] is now occurring 
increasingly through financial channels,” with an “increasing weight of the financial sector in 
the economy.” By providing data on corporate profits derived from portfolio income, while 
also noting that profits in the financial sector in the US from the 1970s onward have surged, 
Krippner (2005) shows that financialization can be characterized as a broader shift toward 
economy-wide reliance on “individuals and institutions that derive their incomes from 
financial assets and transactions” (van der Zwan 2014, 105). In her estimation, this constitutes 
a recurrent effect in capitalism — an effect in modern times that reflects the relationship 
between globalization and the state. 
Krippner’s (2005) analysis hints at the bigger issues of financialization that are relevant for 
transition economies, but is limited by its emphasis on the world’s largest economy during 
some of its toughest or most euphoric economic periods, the United States’ economy. Perhaps 
a more succinct characterization of this idea of financialization as accumulation — one that is 
more applicable in a transition context — is provided by James Crotty (2003, 272), who suggests 
that financialization is a “shift from ‘patient’ committed finance to impatient financial 
markets.” Under this conception, mature financial intermediation, most commonly (but not 
necessarily) assumed to be banks, represents a slower-paced form of finance that is concerned 
with increasing the productive capacities of a country (through well-placed investment) and that 
is guaranteed by retail deposits. On the other hand, impatient finance was a move toward 
capital market-based financing, where securitization, leveraged activity, and the chase for “yield-
differentials” (Gabor 2010, 249) defined the bulk of financial activities. By classifying the 
financial world into these differentially paced types of finance, one has a better sense of where 
financialization actually occurs. It is not merely the introduction of capitalist finance or even a 
spread of bank-based intermediation that induces society-wide financialization, but the move 
toward accumulation (as noted bycontrary to Krippner 2005) driven by the pursuit of short-
term yields.  
This distinction is crucial for my examination of transition because the building of a 
vibrant financial sector was a critical component of transformation itself. The structure of the 
communist economy pre-transition had no room for traditional capitalist financial 
intermediation, with Soviet financial simulacra, such as the GosBank (the central bank), 
serving as mere extensions of government planning agencies. In order to finance the transition 
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and provide capital for the incipient private sector, transition economies needed to both 
cultivate a home-grown base of finance as well as to import foreign financial institutions that 
would perform the “traditional” financial activities of lending to the productive sector. While 
the building of a home-grown banking sector fared well only in a few countries (i.e., Poland 
and Slovenia showing the least foreign penetration at approximately 60 and 22 percent of all 
banks in 2013, respectively), it appears that financial intermediation did succeed in taking root 
in former communist countries (Figure 1). This success was never assured, nor predetermined. 
Berglof and Bolton (2002) cast doubts on the structure of financial transformation in 
transition and speak of a “Great Divide” in progress, while Giacomo Caviglia, Gerhard Krause, 
and Christian Thimann (2003) also noted that the level of financial intermediation one decade 
on remained relatively low. By the time the “transformational recession” (Kornai 1994) was 
completed, financial intermediation had reached levels comparable to advanced capitalist 
economies (although not in the rest of Europe), with credit provided by the financial sector in 
Croatia in 2012 exceeding that of Singapore (96.7 versus 95.9 percent).  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
There has been some dissent on the effects of the financial sector’s introduction in 
transition. For example, Berglof and Bolton (2002, 78) asserted that “the ﬁnancial sector has 
played a small role in the restructuring of the manufacturing sector in transition economies, 
and in some cases ﬁnancial liberalization may have undermined real sector development.” 
However, a large body of evidence — including the works of John Bonin and Paul Wachtel 
(2003), Carlo Cottarelli, Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, and Ivanna Vladkova-Hollar (2005), 
Mariassunta Giannetti and Steven Ongena (2009), and Aleksandr Akimov, Albert Wijeweerab, 
and Brian Dollery (2009) — refutes this early claim.  Perhaps more interestingly, from my 
perspective, is not the spread of banking or the entry of foreign bank institutions, but what 
came subsequently in the wake of the bank entry, namely the shift to “impatient” finance. , … .  
While literature marking the first decade of transition noted that the economies of CEE 
were characterized by “stock markets [that] are highly volatile and illiquid, and their 
sustainability is in question” (Berglof and Bolton 2002, 77), this was not the case in the second 
decade. Indeed, there was a definite sequencing to financial intermediation in transition. In 
fact, Karel Lanoo and Tanja Salem (2001, 94) stated that “the data confirm that transition 
economies have preferred to develop strong intermediaries first, before emphasizing the 
development of [capital] markets.” By the first decade of 2000s, capital markets and the shift to 
“impatient” finance was well underway, with banks themselves expanding credit via 
securitization and the creation of tradable assets from credit activity (Gabor 2010). In tandem 
with the change in bank behavior, large capital inflows from institutional investors in the west, 
resulting from “commercial integration” (Brenton and Gros 1997), also contributed to the 
increase in financialization and expansion of yield-seeking instruments. A comparative 
advantage in the new EU member states also appeared to be driving the financial trends. As 
Allister Keller and Joakim Westerholm (2007, 49) noted, in some ways “eastern” capital 
markets were better functioning than “western ones,” with “results indicat[ing] that while 
established markets are significantly more liquid in terms of average trade size and trade 
numbers, they do not always offer lower transaction costs or volatility.” 
The fact that financialization in transition economies was imported from abroad, and at 
the behest of external actors, is what has made it a fascinating subject to study. The reality of 
what appeared to be a society with little experience of basic financial intermediation, much less 
advanced financial capitalism, suddenly importing financialization in just a decade’s time is 
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unlike any of the earlier work on the Anglo-American experience. However, Or Raviv Pavelink 
(2008, 3013, ???) accurately notes, the transformation of these “political and economic 
structures did not take place in a vacuum or on a tabula rasa, but in a society entwined with 
pre-existing social ties, with institutions that either survived from state socialism or were built 
upon their ruins, and with attitudes, understandings, and behavioral patterns strongly shaped 
by the previous system.” Thus, defining financialization (and its consequences) requires a 
deeper understanding of the institutional changes that accompanied transformation. 
It is here that one runs into a barrier because what is missing in the financialization 
literature (among other things) is an institutional focus — an oversight that is perhaps 
deliberate. As van der Zwan (2014, 115) notes, “financialization studies enter the territory of 
institutionalist analyses of political economy,” but “scholars of financialization have been very 
critical of the institutionalist approach for the assumed coherence of its national models of 
capitalism and its adherence to an analytical paradigm, in which finance is still subservient to 
the productive economy.” However, this ascribes a deterministic and almost caricatured version 
of institutional thought to institutional analyses. It is as much “over the top” as some of the 
criticisms leveled at neoclassical theory that accuse it of being obsessed with the “rational 
actor.” Institutional economics — and especially the “new institutional economics” of Douglass 
North (1993), Ronald Coase (1998), and Oliver Williamson (2000) — is concerned with the 
root causes of institutional creation and change, and thus financialization represents both an 
outcome of institutional shifts and a cause of institutional evolution. This approach can 
address the issue that “studies of financialization cannot fully explain the uneven impact that 
financial markets have had on national political economies. Here, institutionalist contributions 
to political economy might be capable of complicating accounts of how financialization 
evolves” (van der Zwan 2014, 115). Joachim Becker et al. (2010, 241) agree that, “in contrast to 
Keynesian approaches, the State, international organizations and social forces shaping norms 
and policies are an explicit part” of the reality behind financialization (which they explain as 
part of regulationist theory). 
In order to understand the effects of financialization in transition, one must adopt an 
institutional focus that places financialization into the web of institutions which accompanied 
economic and political transition in CEE and FSU countries. This applies particularly to the 
evolution of property rights, which was the key institution that needed to be built in order to 
complete the transition from communism to capitalism. According to Elinor Ostrom (1999, 
332), building on John R. Commons (1924), “a property right is an enforceable authority to 
undertake particular actions in specific domains. The rights of access, withdrawal, 
management, exclusion, and alienation can be separately assigned to different individuals as 
well as being viewed as a cumulative scale moving from the minimal right of access through 
possessing full ownership rights.” A rich literature on the determinants of property rights 
already exists — ranging from anthropological approaches (Hann 1998), to political science 
analysis (Sened 2008), to the sociological literature (Carruthers and Ariovich 2004) — but with 
less work done from the (modern) economics side. A.G. Mijiyawa (2013) perhaps takes the 
most comprehensive look at property rights determinants from an economics standpoint, 
distilling four economic theories about how property rights may arise, including historical 
forces (events that occurred in the distant past, as in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001), 
economic calculations (property rights are created or arise when their benefits outweigh their 
costs, as in Demsetz 1967; North 1971), political realities (institutions emerge as a result of the 
prevailing power structure, as in Sened 2008), or cultural consensus (institutional variations 
reflect political leaders and their belief about what institutions are good for society, as in 
Landes 1999). 
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The move toward property rights in transition economies reflects all these determinants to 
differing degrees, with only the “historical forces” viewpoint having less of an immediate 
impact (although some recent research shows the persistence of historical forces in determining 
the post-communist attitudes toward property in these economies, see Grosfeld and 
Zhuravskaya 2015). The failure of state-led planning changed the political and economic 
calculus in favor of the introduction of property rights, while new leadership in Central and 
Eastern Europe (but not so much in the former Soviet Union) brought a new cultural 
consensus on the desirability of formal and state-protected property rights. Creating such rights 
from whole cloth was difficult, however, given that the entire state apparatus had been directed 
at prohibiting their existence for decades, and only small-scale rights existed mainly in Central 
Europe (e.g., the right to own small agricultural plots in Poland). Thus, the state administration 
had to reorient itself from being the persecutor of property rights to (at least nominally) 
becoming its protector. In reality, this meant that the state had to immediately allow or tolerate 
the existence of formal property rights, moving beyond the small informal rights that had 
emerged during communism, and to permit these rights throughout the country (Hartwell 
2016).  
The best intentions of the architects of transition notwithstanding, the process of 
institutional change in transition economies did not occur in a vacuum, and property rights co-
evolved with a host of other political and economic institutions (some of which supported 
these rights and others which had a less clear effect). As transition moved beyond the 
dismantling of the communist edifice, the state began to take on the role guarantor of the 
“right to withhold” (Commons 1924), with the state (generally through the judiciary) enforcing 
the right of exclusion by private property owners. This shift in the role of the post-communist 
state — from passive player in the emergence of rights to their active guardian — was necessarily 
influenced by many factors, including the state capacity to fulfil its role and the evolution of 
supporting institutions. In regard to state capacity, a gulf emerged between potential property 
rights, or property rights as written in legislation, and realized property rights, or the extent to 
which these rights could be achieved in reality. In countries where capacity was weak, there was 
a greater gap between the two types of rights, meaning that even the best legislation was 
constrained if there were no supporting institutions to implement it. This was clearly seen in 
countries like Ukraine, where the constitution allowed for private property, pledging the state’s 
protection, but corrupt institutions like the police and the judiciary regularly rendered the 
promises of property meaningless.  
In a similar vein, and in line with my current analysis, the desire of the state to act as the 
protector of the right to withhold also became dependent on other institutions that were still 
evolving. As noted above, the development of the financial sector in transition economies was 
driven by both external and endogenous factors, and its unique development path — including 
the development of capital markets and banks alongside each other — was bound to have an 
impact on nascent property rights. Theoretically, the extent of the relationship between 
financialization and property rights is somewhat ambiguous, as the effects appear to be highly 
dependent upon which definition of financialization is explored. From an institutional 
standpoint, the existence of a financial sector, even at its basic levels, is inextricably linked with 
the institutional development of a country. Indeed, the existence of bank-centered 
intermediation presupposes a level of property rights that is absent in countries with no 
banking sector to speak of (just as under communism, the outlawing of private property went 
hand-in-hand with the elimination of capitalist finance and the institution of alternative and 
directed financing arrangements). As Simon Johnson, John McMillan, and Christopher 
Woodruff (2002, 1335) note, “property rights are fundamental: entrepreneurs will not invest if 
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they expect to be unable to keep the fruits of their investment.” While external finance may 
circumvent property rights in a particular country, even the attraction of such finance requires 
a minimum level of property rights to allow for intermediation. Thus, for a country to have a 
thriving banking sector, it has to have at least this minimum level of property rights — a reality 
that has been reinforced by World Bank scholarship on the relationship between lending and 
trust (Bjornskov et al. 2014). If banks can only emerge where property rights exist, then the 
presence of banks (even state-run ones) offers a clue as to the level of property rights in that 
particular country. 
However, an interesting approach by Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram Rajan (2005) 
turns the idea of institutional influence around, postulating that financial institutions 
(specifically banks) are themselves an incipient form of property rights that came into existence 
in order to deal with other institutional distortions. That is, whereas a banking system may 
require property rights to function, the institutional mechanism of the bank acts as an 
additional layer of rights, building a contractual foundation via short-term depository contracts. 
This is a highly localized conception of property rights, because it does not presuppose a 
systemic level of property rights, and the bank’s contractual mechanism can be seen as a 
substitute for broad-based property rights in a system where they are lacking. In other words, 
banking sectors do not only presuppose a minimum level of property rights, but they are a level 
of minimum property rights that can fill the holes left by other distortions in the economy. 
Under the theory of “incomplete contracts,” “the institutional form of the bank … arose to 
improve transaction possibilities over what was contractible through the market place” (Rajan 
1998, 525). 
If one can theorize, as Raghuram Rajan (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2005) have, that 
banks are an early stage of property rights, then how does continued financialization affect 
property rights in the longer term? That is, existing research has only touched upon the first 
definition of financialization, so what would the influence be when an economy shifts either 
toward a greater reliance on capital markets or to a situation where the rentier class gains 
power? Theoretically, there are many different ways in which this relationship can play out. 
Paul Langley (2008), among others, argues that securitization is one of the bases of higher-order 
financialization, a way in which “place-specific uncertainties and debts” can be turned “into 
securities, abstract risks bundled together as financial products” (Grove 2012, 149). Regardless 
of the effects of such securitization (for a good overview of its pitfalls, see Lavoie 2012), its mere 
existence also implies a stronger property rights regime, because such rights are necessary to 
derive a financial stream from various transactions or debt. In other words, financialization 
should be associated with — and possibly also cause — stronger property rights, as the benefits 
of securitization can only be reaped in a stable property rights environment. While Ronald 
Dore (2008, 1109) sees securitization as “depersonaliz[ing] a large range of intercorporate and 
interpersonal relationships,” and thus negatively creating “only contractual property 
relationships which can only be enforced in courts,” such a depersonalization is the hallmark of 
broad-based property rights. 
As a corollary to this possible relationship, financialization may also be able to create a 
constituency for property rights, expanding beyond the minimum threshold of private property 
engendered by banks. That is, the increase in financialization beyond deposits and loan 
origination, captured by commercial banks, may also bring the benefits of finance to more 
individuals, leading to a general public support for rights that make such an intermediation 
possible. However, for this effect to occur, widespread involvement and utilization of the 
financial system (especially capital markets) would be required, with a high degree of 
involvement in a country’s stock market of firms and individuals which are needed to create a 
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broad-based constituency. If such participation did not occur, and capital markets were utilized 
only by a few or by a specific set of politically connected individuals, it is conceivable that 
financialization would lead to lower property rights overall. As Konstantin Sonin (2003) notes, 
the rich have no incentive to advocate for broad property rights protections once they have 
established their own localized property rights, and their interests may even go against such 
rights. 
In a similar vein, the incentives of increased financialization may lead to effects that are 
detrimental to the emergence of broad-based property rights. The financialization literature 
argues that bank-based intermediation, in many ways, is a superior form of financial 
intermediation because it is a more “patient” form of finance (Block and Keller 2009). Under 
this conception, market-based finance engenders financial instability due to its focus on 
shorter-term yields rather than linkages to productive investment. This instability could be 
detrimental to property rights, as calls for stability override the messiness of the marketplace 
and requires a dampening of rights in order to guarantee greater stability. Furthermore, there is 
empirical support for the view that increased financialization, especially when considered as a 
capital markets phenomenon, can be harmful to institutional development. Christopher A. 
Hartwell (2014b) explores this effect for stock market performance in transition, but the same 
effect has not been explored for higher levels of financialization. 
Finally, in regard to the emergence of a rentier class, financialization is likely to stymie the 
development of broad-based property rights. In the first instance, a successful financial sector 
can create a stream of revenues and higher wages that would be incredibly enticing for a 
predatory state. Thus, increased financialization can create the conditions for its own demise, 
as politicians increase regulation and demand rents from the financial sector. This would 
correspond with lower property rights across the entire economy, since it is rare to see a 
government, which demands rents from one sector, obtaining from doing the same in other 
sectors. Additionally, as I argue elsewhere (Hartwell 2014b), there is a strong possibility that 
increased financialization will permit the concentration of political power in the hands of a 
financial sector elite, to the broader detriment of general property rights (Sonin 2003). That is, 
the outsiders of the financial sector slowly become insiders to the political process, which 
allows them to influence legislation and create policies that benefit the financial sector at the 
expense of property rights for all. In this sense, financialization may create its own political 
impetus against property rights, pushing the financial sector ahead of other sectors of the 
economy and giving it advantage vis-a-vis these sectors unfairly. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
 
Empirical Model 
 
To test the proposition of the effect of the various facets of financialization on property rights, 
I utilize a basic econometric model, expressed in by the following equation: 
 Yit=αFINANCEit–1+βMACROINSTit–1+εit      (1) 
 
In equation (1), Y is a measure of property rights, FINANCE is one of the measures of 
financialization (see below), and MACROINST is a vector of macroeconomic and institutional 
controls from the relevant literature that has impacted property rights development. The 
theoretical foundation underpinning the model is that property rights institutions in transition 
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would be affected by the broader institutional environment, macroeconomic outcomes, and, 
my variable of interest — financialization. The model I propose builds on earlier research about 
the determinants of formal property rights by L.J. Alston and G.D. Libecap (1996) and 
Timothy Frye (2004), extending it further. I also reference a model I develop in a previous 
work (Hartwell 2014b) as well as a model developed by Mijiyawa (2013). Additionally, in order 
to mitigate issues of simultaneity and endogeneity, I lag all independent variables one period. 
A key issue is quantifying the extent of property rights. Measuring the Y variable is already 
a difficult prospect, both for the analysis I attempt here (at the monthly level) and in terms of 
conceptual precision. In order to provide a clear picture of the two facets of property rights (see 
Hartwell 2013), I utilize two proxies to capture property rights writ large. The first measure is 
the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG) measure for “investor protection,” a composite 
index that covers three subcomponents (contract viability/expropriation, profit repatriation, 
and payment delays), each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of zero 
points, for a total of twelve points (with higher scores signifying wider property rights). A 
subjective indicator that relies on expert judgment, the ICRG indicator has nevertheless been 
utilized as a proxy for property rights in several works, including by Stoyan Djankov, CaraleeM. 
McLiesh, and R.M. Ramalho (2006) and Bernardin Akitoby and Thomas Stratmann Akitoby 
and Stratmann (2010). More importantly, this measure can be taken as the proxy for potential 
property rights in that the coding of the indicator is based upon the legislation covering 
contract viability and expropriation, rather than necessarily examining the administration of 
these rights. A country with a higher ICRG measure of investor protection would thus be 
assumed to have a more rights-friendly legislative basis, with (in theory) procedures and 
guarantees against expropriation. 
As a check on the subjective ICRG indicator, I also include here an objective measure for 
property rights, “contract-intensive money,” measured as the ratio of money held outside the 
formal banking sector as a proportion of all money. As opposed to the legislative framework 
regarding contracts represented by the ICRG scale, contract-intensive money is an accurate 
representative measure of realized property rights, because it shows the behavior of individuals 
in response to the policies and administration of government. Contract-intensive money has 
been used successfully by a number of researchers to capture property rights (Clague et al. 
1996; Hartwell 2013), based on the theory that stronger property rights manifest themselves in 
a general willingness to hold money in banks rather than “under the mattress.”  
A critique may be leveled against contract-intensive money since it may appear odd to 
utilize (what is essentially) a financial indicator to measure the effects of financialization. In 
fact, this point has been raised by Andrew Williams and Abu Siddique (2008), who note that it 
might be better thought of as a measure of financial sector development more broadly. 
However, as I have noted elsewhere (Hartwell 2014a), while this criticism might be true in 
terms of broader, multi-year movements in contract-intensive money (or for only a point in 
time, as in cross-sectional data), at a relatively high frequency such as this monthly dataset, 
contract-intensive money is more likely to capture perceptions of property rights than slower-
moving financial sector developments.1 Moreover, it has several features that make it suitable 
for my argument here. In the first instance, contract-intensive money comports well with the 
theoretical grounding of Diamond and Rajan (2005) in that banks themselves are a form of 
property rights, and thus utilization of banks would correlate with a higher level of rights. 
Additionally, my goal here is not to assess the usage of banks as having an impact on property 
rights, but rather to assess financialization more broadly, thus looking at money outside of the 
formal financial system since a measure of property rights is a very different from the extent of 
capital market financialization or the permeation of society by finance. Finally, in an 
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econometric sense, there is very little correlation between the contract-intensive money 
indicator and other measures I utilize here, with the strongest being a negative correlation 
between contract-intensive money and stock market capitalization. 
To measure “financialization,” one faces a bigger challenge, especially given the differing 
definitions of financialization that exist. To this point, much of the work concerning 
financialization has been limited to a theoretical or descriptive approach, meaning that 
empirical measurement of financialization is somewhat limited. Paul Kedrosky and Dane 
Stangler (2011)  perhaps) perhaps offer the simplest measure — the size of the financial sector as 
a percentage of GDP — as a crude proxy that can capture the importance of the financial sector 
in a country, but cannot measure the country’s reliance (on (the other definitions of) 
financialization (outlined above). Similarly, Jacob Assa (2012) uses the ratio of employment in 
the finance industry to total employment as another measure for financialization, focusing on 
the extent to which finance has penetrated a society. Going in a different direction, but 
comparable in their approach, are the indicators utilized by Engelbert Stockhammer (2004) 
and G.R. Krippner (2005). Stockhammer (2004) proxies financialization in the US, UK, 
France, and Germany as the sum of interest and dividend income of non-financial businesses 
(that is, measuring the depth of financialization of firms that are not explicitly financial). 
Krippner (2005), on the other hand, uses the portfolio income of non-financial firms and 
profits of financial versus non-financial firms as comparable proxies for financialization in the 
US. Finally, R.B. Freeman (2010) displays perhaps the most comprehensive approach, stating 
that the share of profits of the financial sector, the ratio of financial-sector profits to the wages 
and salaries of all private-sector workers, and the ratio of financial assets divided by GDP are all 
possible ways to measure financialization. 
A common issue of many of these works (notable exceptions being Assa 2012; 
Stockhammer 2004) is that the chosen measure of financialization is not used in an 
econometric analysis. In many cases, the chosen variables are not even utilized in graphic 
analysis or in any rigorous method. Thus, choosing proxies must not only be grounded in the 
theory, but also subject to econometric diagnostics for suitability. Drawing on the broad 
definitions of financialization ( as noted by Epstein 2005; Krippner 2005), I use three proxies 
for the different facets of financialization: 
 
• As a broad measure of financialization, focused on the extent of finance in society (and 
similar to Kedrosky and Stangler 2011), I use the percentage of private credit to GDP. This 
proxy should provide a rough guide to the extent that credit (and debt) is utilized in an 
economy, pointing the way to quantifying the overall financialization of the economy.   
• Whereas private credit to GDP captures bank-based intermediation, the second definition 
of financialization focuses on the ascendance of capital markets. In order to capture this 
phenomenon, I include the log of stock market capitalization as an additional proxy. While 
Krippner (2005, 186) argues “strongly against reducing financialization to developments in 
the stock market,” stock market capitalization should capture the broader move toward 
financialization in an economy beyond banking and bank-related financial intermediation. 
By examining the size of the stock exchange, and not just its performance, I hope to 
capture broader financialization trends. 
• As a narrow measure for financialization that would capture the third definition of the 
power of the rentier class, I also include (along the lines of Freeman 2010) the ratio of 
average gross monthly wages for the financial sector to the country’s wage for all occupations. This 
final proxy should capture the way in which the financial sector is valued in a country, 
 12 
with higher ratios showing more importance being placed on finance and financiers and 
likely their political power as well. 
 
I complement these financialization indicators by a set of institutional and macroeconomic 
controls derived from the relevant literature (see Garcia and Liu 1999; Hartwell 2014; Mijiyawa 
2013) that I fInd to be associated with the development of property rights. In the first instance, 
the composition of a country’s political system, especially regarding actors’ ability to enter and 
influence the system, would likely determine the strength of property rights protection. 
Theoretically, the relationship between democracy and property rights is unclear. It is quite 
possible that highly democratic societies will vote in a manner that does not necessarily respect 
private property, especially for issues deemed to be in the “public good” (Knutsen 2011). In a 
recent work (Hartwell 2014b), I provide evidence regarding transition economies that 
somewhat supports this thesis In particular, I find that democracy has a detrimental effect on 
property rights development in countries that already have a low level of property rights 
protection (this effect disappears at higher levels of rights) (Hartwell 2014b). However, 
Christopher Clague et al. (1996) hypothesize (and provide evidence) that a democratic polity is 
more likely to support the rule of law than an autocrat, meaning that higher levels of 
democratic accountability should correspond to better property rights. Empirical evidence from 
C.H. Knutsen (2011), provided in a developing country context, also supports this effect — 
meaning that the overall relationship is theoretically unclear in the current context.  
In regard to macroeconomic controls, I include both inflation and growth of the money 
supply (M2) as proxies for macroeconomic mismanagement and central bank influence on 
property rights development, respectively. Indeed, including growth of money supply is crucial 
in order to isolate effects of financialization from mere government money-priming to the stock 
market. Interestingly, the financialization literature appears to entirely ignore the role of central 
bank monetary expansion (as opposed to interest rate manipulation) as a key driver of financial 
outcomes, such as higher stock prices. This, in turn, may drive up wages in the financial sector 
and draw more employees into finance. Thus, financialization may not be a constraining factor 
on central banks (Epstein 2001), but a direct consequence of bank behavior — a fact that needs 
to be controlled for here. Similarly, capital account openness (as measured by Chinn and Ito 
2008) could be another form of financialization (Stockhammer 2012), but I include it in this 
model as a measure of openness to financialization in the sense that, just as exports and 
imports signal an openness to trade (and all of the effects that come from that), so could 
openness to capital flows signal the ability of financialization to enter the system. Thus, capital 
openness is a necessary attribute of financialization in transition economies, but it is not a 
sufficient one.2 As a final control, I include economic growth here as it may have a salutary 
effect on the momentum toward property rights in transition. While prior research has found 
only a weak causality between growth and levels of economic freedom (Justesen 2008), such an 
effect is likely to be stronger in transition economies since property rights beget growth that, in 
turn, creates more support for these rights. Rafael La Porta et al. (1999, 222) succinctly 
expresses the theoretical basis for this by noting: “[G]iven that institutional engineering is 
costly, high economic growth is exactly what generates the resources necessary for policymakers 
to establish, reform, or improve existing institutions and policies.” 
 
Data and Estimation Strategy 
 
The data to populate the model shown in equation (1) come from various sources, 
including the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, various national statistical and central 
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bank websites, Datastream and Bloomberg for financial data, and ICRG for their institutional 
indicators. As noted above, the data is from the period between 1989 to 2012, depending upon 
the country and, where possible, is gathered on a monthly basis.3 The use of monthly — rather 
than annual — data helps to track institutional changes at much more disaggregated level, as 
well as to capture gradual increases in financialization (which is itself a slow-building 
phenomenon).  
 
Table 2 here 
 
The use of monthly data causes some issues in availability. For example, while the property 
rights indicators have good coverage for a long time-series for nearly every country, coverage on 
a monthly basis is much easier to find for the broader financialization statistics than for the 
wage data. Similarly, many macroeconomic indicators that are expressed as a percentage of 
GDP are only to be found on a quarterly (publicly available) basis. In this instance, I utilize the 
linear interpolation method of G.C. Chow and An-loh. Lin (1971) to expand the GDP data 
and to retain the more readily available monthly data on institutions, stock markets, and other 
financial indicators. For other data that was only available on a quarterly basis, I retain the 
original series with a concomitant loss in observations. This is necessary with some series 
because average wages in the financial sector show substantial variation on a month-to-month 
basis in countries with complete monthly time series data, thus making interpolation a difficult 
and potentially misleading approach. 
The econometric specification I use for equation (1) is a fixed-effects model using the 
Driscoll-Kraay (1998) standard errors to account for pervasive heteroskedasticity and possible 
autocorrelation. The advantage of Driscoll-Kraay errors is that they are designed specifically for 
“large T” datasets, such as this one (Hoechle 2007), which tend to exhibit cross-sectional 
correlations across spatial units (in this instance, countries). In a transition context, correcting 
for this reality is incredibly important as the simultaneity of the transition process means a 
higher likelihood of cross-sectional “contamination” via policies, social linkages, or even crises 
(such as financial crises or war). Within this dataset, I confirm the presence of spatial 
correlation via a Breusch-Pagan (1980) LM test of independence (also designed for “large T” 
datasets), thus arguing for the use of Driscoll-Kraay standard errors. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
As noted in the theoretical discussion above, there is a strong chance that any econometric 
estimation will be plagued by reverse causality because it could be that property rights have the 
dominant influence on financialization, not the other way around. In order to examine this 
issue empirically, I first undertake a series of Granger causality tests of each measure of 
financialization versus my two measures of property rights. Given that the metrics I use are 
stationary (as verified by a series of unit root tests, which I do not reported here), the preferred 
method for testing Granger causality is the Toda-Yamamoto (1995) approach, which utilizes a 
vector auto-regression (VAR) approach to check short-term causality.4 Using an optimal lag 
length of four, as determined by minimized Akaike-Schwatrz information criterion (AIC and 
SIC respectively), I show the results of the Granger causality testing in Table 2. For the most 
part, the Granger causality between financialization and property rights is inconclusive under 
the VAR structure an expected response in an environment such as a transition economy, 
which is characterized by feedback and coevolution. The only strong associations I find in this 
data run from the ratio of financial wages indicator to contract-intensive money (as our theory 
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would predict), and from contract-intensive money to stock market capitalization. This result 
does not vitiate the belief that stock market capitalization may have an actual (not Granger) 
causal effect on realized property rights. It merely shows that the predictive power of the extent 
of stock market capitalization is significantly related to realized property rights.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In order to establish a more concrete causal link, therefore, I turn to the results of the 
regressions in Table 3 for each metric of property rights and for financialization in transition 
economies. Columns 1-4 of Table 3 indicate the relationship between the financialization 
variables and the investor-protection measure of property rights, while columns 5-7 show 
contract-intensive money as the dependent variable. The results are interesting from the outset, 
and appear to vindicate Diamond and Rajan’s (2005) thesis that bank intermediation does 
contribute to higher property rights. In columns 1 and 5, for both metrics of property rights, 
private credit as a percentage of GDP is strongly and significantly associated with property 
rights in a positive way (and it is important to note here that, in a transition context, private 
credit is almost exclusively given by banks rather than non-bank intermediaries or capital 
markets). The scale of the effect is very small: each percentage increase in credit leads to an 
increase of only 0.002 in the ICRG scoring. In regard to contract-intensive money, the effect is 
even smaller, with each increase in private credit associated with a 0.0002 increase in money 
held in the formal banking sector. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
However, once I start to explore other metrics of financialization, the relationship begins 
to change. In particular, using the growth in the stock market as a proxy for financialization 
(column 2), it appears that there is a mildly positive, but insignificant effect on investor 
protection. Two interesting issues are at play here in the specification of investor protection 
versus stock market capitalization, which warrant further investigation. The first issue is that, 
unlike credit, democracy appears to be a strong and negative influence on property rights in the 
presence of a booming stock market. The second issue is that, despite the limited significance 
of all variables apart from inflation, the model shows a high R2. This is an econometric warning 
sign, indicative of either multicollinearity or endogeneity. In this instance, multicollinearity is 
less likely as pairwise correlations show little evidence of difficulties (Table 43), and a variance-
inflation factor analysis (VIF in Table 54) also shows no red flags. However, endogeneity is 
quite possibly an issue in relation to the democracy indicator, as financialization theory writ 
large would predict: Earlier levels of financialization could have a negative effect on democracy, 
because more powerful financial interests could manipulate the fragile democratic system for 
their own ends. This also comports with the reality of many transition countries, where 
“oligarchs” and politically connected insiders were able to use their financial power to the 
detriment of democracy, and thus to property rights (Russia is the biggest example of this 
trend). 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 about here 
 
To correct for this issue econometrically, column 3 of Table 3 shows an instrumental 
variable, generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) regression, which instruments democracy 
in transition as both a function of previous financialization (in this case, a prior-period stock 
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market size) and bank intermediation (as measured by private credit to GDP). Under the 
assumption that democracy interacts with the growth of financialization, while being 
simultaneously influenced by the previous level of bank-related property rights (the Diamond-
Rajan thesis), I should be able to see a more statistically “clean” relationship by accounting for 
this endogeneity. Based on the IV-GMM estimation results, this does appear to be the case 
since the stock market size now has an unambiguously negative and significant relationship 
with property rights, while democracy also remains a negative explanator (Hartwell 2014). In 
terms of scale, a 1.0-percent increase in the (log) stock market capitalization of a country will 
lead to a decrease of 0.0027 in its ICRG investor protection score. Standard IV-GMM checks 
also show that endogeneity was an issue in the model for democracy, but that our choice of 
instruments was appropriate in the econometric sense (as evidenced by the Kleibergen-Paap 
and Hansen J-statistics). Thus, financialization in the form of capital markets appears to have 
had a negative influence on property rights legislation in a transition context. 
The issue of endogeneity is also present in regards to stock market capitalization versus 
contract-intensive money, as shown in the Granger causality tests in Table 2. If previous 
information regarding realized property rights can help predict the level of stock market 
capitalization, it is likely that prior-period property rights could also have influenced the 
development of the stock market. To take into account this feedback effect, column 6 of Table 
3 has an IV-GMM regression that instruments the lagged level of stock market capitalization 
with prior-period levels of contract-intensive money, as predicted by the Granger causality 
results. This instrumentation, in addition to being econometrically valid, returns a similar 
result as in the investor protection regression, albeit at a lower level of economic significance. 
Here, too, democracy has almost double the negative effect as financialization on property 
rights, lending support to the idea that a rentier class might not be as detrimental to property 
rights as the voting power of one’s neighbor. 
The final metric of financialization — financial sector wages as a proportion of all wages — 
gives comparable results regarding the negative influence of increased financialization with the 
same effect as stock market capitalization. In particular, financial sector wages show a negative 
effect on both property rights measures, but, interestingly, are only statistically significant in 
regard to contract-intensive money. Indeed, for each unit increase in the ratio of financial 
wages to overall average wages, there is a 1.0-percent decline in realized property rights in a 
specific transition economy. It appears that, in a world where financialization manifests itself 
via greater demand for financial workers, individuals find their own property rights to be less 
secure. The behavior of democracy in this regression, counter to the previous five models, may 
also be capturing this effect since democracy now shows as a positive contributor to realized 
property rights. In this model, the pressure on property rights may not come from broad-based 
democracy, but from the democracy of the rentier class. Once this is accounted for, democracy 
has a positive effect on property rights. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this article, I attempted to examine the effects of financialization on property rights in a 
highly specific context — transition economies. Exploring the theoretical relationships between 
increased financialization across three definitions, I endeavored to clarify the interplay between 
and influence of the evolution of financial institutions on the creation and development of 
property rights. Using a unique monthly database of financial and institutional indicators over 
a period from 1989 to 2012, I tested empirically these theories, with the results indicating that 
the influence of financialization dependent upon how one defines “financialization.” Higher-
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order financialization, captured in stock market capitalization, or in the ratio of financial wages 
to the average wage, has uniformly negative effects on the development of property rights. 
These results hold no matter which indicator of property rights — potential or realized — I 
utilized. Indeed, these results appear to vindicate Diamond and Rajan’s (2005) thesis that 
broader bank-based intermediation does have a significant and positive influence on property 
rights, although my econometric specification cannot discern if banks themselves were the 
source of these rights or merely provided the base for property rights gains. Future empirical 
and theoretical research into this issue, including examination of the local circumstances of 
specific transition economies, would shed light on the role of banks in fostering property 
rights. 
While more work needs to be done in the area of quantitative institutional economics (a 
term that some might find oxymoronic), this article serves as a unique bridge between 
institutional and financialization approaches. Moreover, I believe that these two approaches 
should continue to explore synergies in the examination of how the financial sector affects the 
real economy and the evolution of other institutions. The non-dogmatic nature of institutional 
approaches lends itself to a methodological and theoretical framework for understanding 
financialization. As Williamson (2000, 595) noted in his overview of new institutional 
economics, “the recommendation is that, [while] awaiting a unified theory, we should be 
accepting of pluralism.” This pluralism, contrary to what Julie Froud, Adam Leaver, and Karel 
Williams (2007) or Wolfgang Streeck (2010) assume, means that one can examine the interplay 
between institutions and the financial sector without necessarily embedding either one into a 
normative framework. Perhaps most importantly, institutional analysis rightly believes that “the 
determinants of institutions are susceptible to analysis by the tools of economic theory” 
(Matthews 1986, 903), meaning that financialization can be subject to a more rigorous 
empirical and theoretical examination for its existence, causes, and consequences. This 
blending of new institutionalist economics and the more sociological tradition of 
financialization research can, in turn, expand the sum of knowledge about the effect of 
financialization on all forms of institutions. 
 
Footnotes: 
 
1 Clague et al. (1996) also run several empirical tests on their measure of contract-intensive 
money and find that it does capture different effects than other financial sector development 
indicators. 
2 Unfortunately, the Chinn-Ito indicator is only available annually, and thus it is 
extrapolated monthly based on annual coding (as in Block 2003). 
3 The countries covered in this analysis include Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, 
Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. These countries 
were chosen based on data availability, and excluded countries had exigencies regarding their 
financial sectors or data availability issues that made them unsuitable. For example, in addition 
to having no data on financial wages, the stock exchange in Albania was created as part of the 
central bank in 1996 and is currently non-operational. Similarly, Armenia had a moribund 
stock exchange until being purchased in 2009 by NASDAQ, meaning a much shorter time-
series than the other countries shown here (in addition, financial wage data was not available). 
Finally, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova had little to no data available on financial wages, 
and Moldova’s data on stock market capitalization was incomplete and riddled with gaps. 
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4 Jushan Bai and Pierre Perron’s (1998) test was also conducted to determine if there were 
structural breaks within the data. No structural breaks were detected Across each institutional 
and financialization metric. 
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